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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the potential effect of
the adversarially training on the robustness of six advanced
deep neural networks against a variety of targeted and non-
targeted adversarial attacks. We firstly show that, the ResNet-56
model trained on the 2D representation of the discrete wavelet
transform appended with the tonnetz chromagram outperforms
other models in terms of recognition accuracy. Then we demon-
strate the positive impact of adversarially training on this model
as well as other deep architectures against six types of attack
algorithms (white and black-box) with the cost of the reduced
recognition accuracy and limited adversarial perturbation. We
run our experiments on two benchmarking environmental sound
datasets and show that without any imposed limitations on the
budget allocations for the adversary, the fooling rate of the
adversarially trained models can exceed 90%. In other words,
adversarial attacks exist in any scales, but they might require
higher adversarial perturbations compared to non-adversarially
trained models.
Index Terms—Spectrogram, Chromagram, Tonnetz Features,
Discrete Wavelet Transformation (DWT), Short-Time Furrier
Transformation (STFT), Sound Classification, Deep Neural Net-
work, ResNet-56, Adversarial Attack, Adversarially Training.
I. INTRODUCTION
The existence of adversarial attacks has been characterized
for data-driven audio and speech recognition models for both
waveform and representation domains [1], [2]. During the past
years, many strong white and black-box adversarial algorithms
have been introduced which they basically recast costly op-
timization problems against victim classifiers. Unfortunately,
these attacks effectively degrade the classification performance
of almost all data-driven models from conventional classifiers
(e.g., support vector machines) to the state-of-the-art deep
neural networks [3]. This poses an extreme growing concern
about the security and the reliability of the classifiers.
The typical approach in crafting adversarial example is to
solve an optimization problem in order to obtain the smallest
possible perturbations for the legitimate samples, undetectable
by a human, aiming at fooling the classifier. The commonly
used measures to compare the altered sample with the orig-
inal one are l2 or l∞ similarity metrics. The computational
complexity of this optimization process is dependent to the di-
mensions of the given input samples. Consequently, it requires
considerable computational overhead for high dimensional
data, even in the case of short audio signals [1]. However,
regardless of the computational cost of the attacks, this threat
actively exists for any end-to-end audio and speech classifier.
Since the highest recognition accuracies have been reported
on 2D representations of audio signals [2], [4], the optimized
attack algorithms developed for computer vision applications
such as fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [5] led to security
concerns for audio classifiers [3].
Although some approaches have been introduced for de-
fending victim models against adversarial attacks, there is not
yet a reliable framework achieving the required efficiency.
Based on the detailed discussion in [6], common defence
algorithms usually obfuscate gradient information but running
stronger attack algorithms against them consistently fool these
detectors. Unfortunately, vulnerability against adversarial at-
tacks is an open problem in data-driven classification and
though the generated fake examples look very similar to
noisy samples, they lie in dissimilar subspaces [3], [7]. It
has been shown that adversarial examples lie in the manifolds
marginally over the decision boundary of the victim classifier,
where the model lacks of generalizability [3]. Therefore,
integrating these examples into the training set of the victim
classifier could improve the robustness. This approach, known
as adversarial training [5], might be a more reasonable defense
approach without shattering gradient vectors [6]. However,
there is no guarantee for the safety of the adversarially trained
classifiers [8].
Although there are some discussions in the computer vision
domain about the negative effect of the adversarial training
on the recognition performance of the victim classifiers [9].
However, at the best of our knowledge, this potential side
effect has not been studied for the 2D representation of audio
signals. We address this issue in this paper and report our
results on two benchmarking environmental sound datasets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we review some related works about adversarial attacks de-
veloped for 2D domains. Details about signal transformation
and 2D representation production are provided in Section III
and IV, respectively. In Section V, we briefly introduce our
selected front-end audio classifiers which are state-of-the-art
deep learning architectures. The adversarial attack procedures
and budget allocation for the adversary are discussed in
Section VI. Accordingly, section VII explains the adversarial
training framework and obtained results are summarized in
Section VIII.
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II. RELATED WORKS
There is a large volume of published studies on attacking
classifiers using different optimization techniques aiming to ef-
fectively disrupt their recognition performances. In this paper,
we focus on five strong white-box targeted and non-targeted
attack algorithms which have been reported to be very de-
structive when used on advanced deep learning models trained
on audio representations [2]. Moreover, we also use a black-
box adversarial attack, based on the gradient approximation,
against the victim classifiers .
The fast gradient sign method is a well-established baseline
in targeted adversarial attack. The computational cost of this
one-shot approach at runtime is low, taking advantage of the
linear characteristics in deep neural networks. Kurakin et al.
[10] introduced an iterative version of FGSM, known as the
basic iterative method (BIM), for running stronger attacks
against victim classifiers and is formulated at:
x′n+1 = clip {x′n + ζsgn (∇xJ [x′n, l(x)])} (1)
where the legitimate and its associated adversarial examples
are represented by x and x′, respectively. The initial state in
this recursive formulation is x′0 = x in the -neighbourhood
(the distance measured by a similarity metric such as l2) of
the legitimate manifold. This is followed by a clipping oper-
ation for keeping the adversarial perturbation within [−, ].
Moreover, l(x) and sgn(·) stand for the label of x and the
general sign function. In Eq. 1, the step size ζ = 1, though
it is tunable according to the adversary’s wishes. Two types
of optimizations can be used with Eq. 1: (1) optimizing up to
reach the first adversarial example (BIM-a) and (2) continuing
the optimization up to a predefined number of iterations (BIM-
b). For measuring the , two similarity metrics are suggested:
l∞ and l2. In this work, we focus on the latter.
Gradient information of a deep neural network contains
direction of intensity variation associated with the model deci-
sion boundary. Exploiting these information vectors for finding
the least likely probability distribution is the key idea of the
Jacobian-based Saliency map attack (JSMA) [11]. For the
adversarial label l′, this iterative attack algorithm runs against
the model f and strives to achieve l′ = argmaxj fj(x). The
JSMA increases the probability of the target label l′ while
minimizes those of the other classes including the ground-
truth using a saliency map as shown in Eq. 2.
S(x, l′)[i] = |Ji,l′(x)|
∑
j 6=l′
Ji,j(x)
 (2)
where Ji,j denotes the forward derivative of the model for the
feature i computed as:
Jf [i, j](x) =
∂fj(x)
∂xi
(3)
the Jacobian vectors associated with label l′ and values of the
saliency map less or greater than zero (no variation shield),
S(x, l′)[i] = 0. This white-box attack algorithm searches,
iteratively, the feature index on which the perturbation will
be applied in order to fool the model toward the target label
l′ using the similarity metric l0.
The perturbation required for pushing a sample over the
decision boundary of the victim classifier should be as minimal
as possible. In a white box scenario, the optimization process
uses local properties of the decision boundary. It has been
shown that linearizing the boundary in the subspace of the
original samples can yield to adversarial perturbation smaller
than FGSM attack. This approach, known as the DeepFool
attack, is shown in Eq. 4 [12]:
argmin ‖‖2 ,  = −f(x)w/‖w‖22 (4)
where the w refers to the weight function of the recogni-
tion model. Unlike other abovementioned adversarial attacks,
DeepFool is a non-targeted attack and it iterates as many times
as needed for pushing a random samples to be marginally over
the locally linearized decision boundary with the condition of
maximizing the prediction likelihood toward any labels other
than the ground-truth. Though both l2 or l∞ measurement
metrics can be used in the DeepFool attack, we use latter in
accordance with BIM algorithms.
Presumably, a straightforward approach for keeping an
adversarial perturbation undetectable can be achieved by re-
ducing its magnitude and distribute it over all input features.
Additionally, not every feature should be perturbed and their
gradient vectors should not be shattered. Following these
two assumptions, Carlini and Wagner attack (CWA) has been
introduced [13]. The general framework of their proposed
algorithm is based on the following minimization problem:
min ‖x′ − x‖22 + c · L(x′) (5)
where the constant c is obtainable through a binary search.
Finding the most appropriate value for this hyperparameter
is very challenging since it may easily dominate the distance
function and push the sample too far away from the adversarial
subspace. Although in Eq. 5 the l2 similarity metric for
computing the adversarial perturbation  is employed, CWA
properly generalizes for both l0 and l∞. In the configuration of
this adversarial attack, the loss function L is defined over the
logits of Z for the trained model f as shown in the following
equation:
L(x′) = max
[
max
i6=l′
{Z(x′)i − Z(x′)l′ ,−κ}
]
(6)
where κ controls the effectiveness and the adjacency of the
adversarial examples to the decision boundary of the model.
In this regard, higher values for this parameter in conjunc-
tion with a minimum -neighbourhood results in adversarial
examples with higher confidence.
For achieving the overall unrestricted adversarial perturba-
tion (‖‖2) with small enough magnitude, CWA solves Eq. 5
through the following optimization framework:
min
ρ
∥∥∥∥12 (tanh(ρ) + 1)− x
∥∥∥∥2
2
+ c · L
(
1
2
tanh(ρ) + 1
)
(7)
where ρ = arctan(x + δ) and the unrestricted approximate
perturbation δ∗ is as the following.
δ∗ =
1
2
(tanh(ρ+ 1))− x (8)
This perturbation is unrestricted and it should be tuned for
feature values by measuring ∇f(x + δ∗). For feature inten-
sities with negligible gradient values, the actual adversarial
perturbation truncates to zero, and for the rest: δ ← δ∗.
Attacking victim classifiers while there is an unrestricted
access to the details of the attacked models, including the
training dataset, hyperparameters, architecture, and more im-
portantly gradient information, like all the abovementioned
attack algorithms, is less challenging compared to the black-
box attack scenarios. Usually, in the latter scheme, the ad-
versary runs gradient estimation via querying the classifier by
training a surrogate model. In this paper, the chosen black-
box attack is the natural evolution strategy (NES [14]) which
has been employed for gradient approximation in [15]. This
iterative algorithm is known as partial information attack
(PIA) and it encodes l∞ similarity metric as part of its
targeted optimization problem. Finding the proper adversarial
perturbation bound for PIA is to some extent challenging and
requires a very high number of querying to the victim model.
Before discussing on how adversarial attack and adver-
sarial training on various deep neural network architectures
have been implemented, we firstly need to provide a brief
overview on the transformation of an audio signal into 2D
representations. The next section will describe spectrogram
generation using short time Fourier transformation (STFT),
discrete wavelet transformation (DWT), and tonnetz feature
extraction. We will then train our classifiers using these rep-
resentations and investigate how adversarial training impacts
their robustness to adversarial attacks.
III. AUDIO TRANSFORMATION
Since audio and speech signals have high dimensionality in
time domain, their 2D representations with lower dimension-
alities have been widely used for training advanced classifiers
originally developed for 2D computer vision applications [16].
In this work, we use STFT and DWT, both with and without
tonnetz features for generating 2D representations of audio sig-
nals. This section briefly reviews the required transformations
by this work.
For a discrete signal a[n] distributed over time n using the
Hann window function H[·], we can compute the complex
Fourrier transformation using the following equation:
STFT
{
a[n]
}
(m,ω) =
∞∑
n=−∞
a[n]H[n−m]e−jωn (9)
where m is the time scale and m n. Additionally, ω stands
for the continuous frequency coefficient. This transformation
applies on shorter overlapping sub-signals with a predefined
sampling rate and forms the STFT spectrogram as shown in
Eq. 10.
(10)SPSTFT
{
a[n]
}
(m,ω) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
n=−∞
a[n]w[n−m]e−jωn
∣∣∣∣∣
2
There are several variants of the STFT transformation such
as mel-scale and cepstral coefficient, producing even lower
dimensionality, that have been widely used for various speech
processing tasks [17], [18]. However in this work, we use the
standard STFT representation for training the front-end dense
classifiers.
Generating DWT spectrogram is very similar to the Fourrier
transformation as they both employ continuous and differen-
tiable basis functions. For the wavelet transformation, several
functions have been studied and their effectiveness for audio
signals have been investigated in [19], [20]. The general form
of this transformation for a continuous function a(t) is shown
in Eq. 11.
DWT
{
a(t)
}
=
1√|s|
∫ ∞
−∞
a(t)ψ
(
t−τ
s
)
dt (11)
where τ and s refer to the time variations in the transformation
and the wavelet scale, respectively. Moreover, ν stands for the
basis mother functions. Common choices for this function are
Haar, Mexican Hat, and complex Morlet. The latter has been
extensively used in signal processing, mainly because of its
nonlinear characteristics [16] (see Eq. 12).
ψ(t) =
1√
2pi
e−jωte−t
2/2 (12)
The complex Morlet is continuous in its conjugate manifold.
The convolution of this function with overlapping chunks of
the given audio signal results in its spectral visualization as
described in Eq. 13.
SPDWT
{
a(t)
}
=
∣∣DWT{a[k, n]}∣∣ (13)
where k and n are integer numbers associated with scales of
ψ.
The two aforementioned transformations represent spa-
tiotemporal modulation features of a signal in the frequency
domain, regardless of its harmonic characteristics. It has been
demonstrated that using harmonic change detection function
(HCDF) provides distinctive features for the audio signal
[21]. This function provides chromagram from the constant-
Q transformation (CQT) which are also known as tonnetz
features. According to [21], there are four major steps in a
HCDF system. Firstly, the audio signal is converted into a
logarithmic spectrum vectors using CQT. Then, pitch-class
vectors are extracted from the tonal transformation based on
the quantized chromagram. In the third step, 6-dimensional
centroid vectors form a tensor from the tonal transformation.
Finally, a smoothing operation postprocesses this tensor for
distance calculation.
We use HCDF system for generating spectrogram from
audio signals in order to enhance recognition performance of
the classifiers. In the next section, we provide details of this
process for two benchmarking environmental sound datasets.
IV. SPECTROGRAM PRODUCTION
We produce STFT representation based on the instructions
provided by the open source Python library Librosa [22]. We
set the windows size and the hop length (n and m in Eq. 9)
to 2048 and 512, respectively. Additionally, we initialize the
number of filters to 2048 which is the standard value for
the environmental sounds task [16]. Audio chunks associated
with each window are padded in order to reduce the potential
negative effect of loosing temporal dependencies. Furthermore,
the frames are overlapped using a ratio of 50%.
For generating DWT spectrograms, we use our modified
version of the wavelet sound explorer [23] with the complex
Morlet mother function. As proposed by [4], we set the DWT
sampling frequency to 16 KHz for ESC-50 and 8 KHz for
UrbanSound8K with the uniform 50% overlapping ratio. For
enhancement purposes, we use the logarithmic visualization
on the generated spectrograms to better characterize high
frequency areas.
For the tonnetz chromagram, we use the default settings
provided by Librosa with the sampling rate of 22.05 KHz.
We resize the resulting chromagrams in such a way that the
result will comply with the aforementioned representations.
Inspired from [24], we append these features to the STFT
and DWT spectrograms and organize them into two additional
representations. In the next section, we provide more details
about the training of the front-end classifiers using these four
spectrogram sets.
V. CLASSIFICATION MODELS
Since an adversary runs the adversarial attack against the
classifier, the choice of the victim network architecture affects
the fooling rate of the model. This issue has been studied
in [2] for the advanced GoogLeNet [25] and AlexNet [26]
architectures trained on DWT (with linear, logarithmic, and
logarithmic real visualizations), STFT, and their pooled spec-
trograms. Since our main objective is investigating the adver-
sarial training impacts on different classifiers, we additionally
include ResNet-X architectures with X ∈ {18, 34, 56} [27]
and VGG-16 [28] architectures.
The pretrained models of these six classifiers have been
used and the input and output layers have been fine-tuned
as described in [2]. Computational hardware used for all
experiments are two NVIDIA GTX-1080-Ti with 4 × 11 GB
memory in addition to a 64-bit Intel Core-i7-7700 (3.6 GHz)
CPU with 64 GB RAM. We carry out our experiments using
the five-fold cross validation setup for all the spectrogram sets.
As a common practice in model performance analysis, we pre-
serve 70% of the entire samples for training and development
followed by running the early stopping scenario. We report
recognition accuracy of these models for the remaining 30%
samples.
In the next section, we provide the detailed setup for the
adversarial algorithms mentioned in section II. We addition-
ally discuss budget allocations required by the adversary for
successfully attacking the six finely trained victim models.
VI. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK SETUP
For effectively attacking the classifiers, the adversary should
tune the hyperparameters required by the attack algorithms
such as the number of iteration, the perturbation limitation, the
number of line search within the manifold, which we express
them all as the budget allocations. For finding the optimal
required budgets, we bind the fooling rates of the attack
algorithms to a predefined threshold AUC > 0.9 associated
with the area under curve of the attack success. In other
words, we allocate as much budget as needed for reaching the
AUC > 0.9 for all attacks against the victim models. This is a
critical threshold for demonstrating the extreme vulnerability
of neural networks against adversarial attacks.
In accordance to the above note, we use Foolbox [29], the
freely available python package in support of the uniform
reproducible implementations of the attack algorithms. For
the BIM-a and BIM-b algorithms, we define the  ≥ 0.0015
with the confidence of (≥ 75%). In the JSMA framework, we
set the number of iterations to a maximum of 1000 and the
scaling factor within [0, 250] (with equivalent displacement
of 50). The number of iterations in the DeepFool attack is
initialized to 100 with the supremum value in light of 600
and the static step of 100. For the costly CWA attack, we
set the search step c ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} within the number of
iteration {25, 100, 1k, 1.5k} associated with every c. Except
of the DeepFool which is a non-targeted attack, we randomly
select targeted wrong labels for the rest of the algorithms.
There are four hyperparameters required for the black-box
PIA algorithm. We empirically limit the perturbation bound
to  ≥ 0.001 followed by an iterative line search to find
the most approximately optimal variance in the NES gradient
estimation. We initialize the number of iteration to 500 with
decay rate of 0.001 and the learning rate η ∈ [0.001, 0.6].
In the framework which we attack the front-end audio clas-
sifiers, we run the algorithms on the shuffled batches of 500
samples up to 50 batches of 100 samples randomly selected
from the clean spectrograms in every step toward spanning
the entire datasets. These attacks are performed considering
the abovementioned allocated budgets once before and after
adversarially training in order to measure the robustness of
the models. Section VII provides details on how adversarial
training has been implemented.
VII. ADVERSARIALLY TRAINING
The idea of adversarial training was firstly proposed in [5],
where authors showed that, augmenting the training dataset
with the one-shot FGSM adversarial examples improves the
robustness of the victim models. As commonly known, the
main advantage of this simple approach is that, it does not
shatter nor obfuscate gradient information while runs a fast
non-iterative procedure. This has made the adversarial training
to be a relatively reliable defense approach. However, it may
not confidently defend against stronger white-box adversarial
algorithms [8].
Many adversarial defense approaches have been introduced
during the past years which have been reported to outperform
DWT ‖‖2 = 1.32 ‖‖2 = 1.29 ‖‖0 = 1.07 ‖‖2 = 0.49 ‖‖2 = 2.18 ‖‖∞ = 1.76
DWT | Tonnetz ‖‖2 = 1.93 ‖‖2 = 1.21 ‖‖0 = 1.59 ‖‖2 = 0.91 ‖‖2 = 2.69 ‖‖∞ = 1.35
STFT ‖‖2 = 2.15 ‖‖2 = 1.18 ‖‖0 = 2.28 ‖‖2 = 1.98 ‖‖2 = 1.83 ‖‖∞ = 2.14
STFT | Tonnetz ‖‖2 = 0.84 ‖‖2 = 1.63 ‖‖0 = 2.51 ‖‖2 = 2.65 ‖‖2 = 1.88 ‖‖∞ = 2.06
Fig. 1: Crafted adversarial examples for the ResNet-56 using the six optimization-based attack algorithms. The first column
of the figure denotes the original representations for the randomly selected sample from the class of ’children playing’ in the
UrbanSound8K dataset. Other columns are associated with the attack algorithms namely, BIM-a, BIM-b, JSMA, DeepFool,
CWA, and PIA, respectively. Adversarial Perturbation values have been written at the bottom of each adversarial spectrogram.
FGSM-based adversarially training [30], [31], [32]. However,
some studies have been reported that these advanced defense
approaches shatter gradient vectors and they might easily break
against strong adversarial attacks which do not incorporate
the exact gradient information such as the backward pass
differentiable approximation [6].
Augmenting the clean training dataset with adversarial
examples in the adversarially trained framework is shown in
Eq. 14 [5].
J ′(x, l,w) = αJ(x, l,w) + (1− α)J(x′, l,w) (14)
where α is a subjective weight scalar definable by the ad-
versary. Additionally, J and w denote the loss function and
the derived weight vector of the victim model, respectively.
Moreover x and x′ refer to the legitimate and adversarial
example associated with the genuine label l. Adversarial
training using a costly attack algorithm is very time-consuming
and memory prohibitive in practice. Therefore, we use the
FGSM for augmenting the original spectrogram datasets with
the adversarial examples according to the assumption of
J ′(x, l,w) = J(x′, l,w).
In the next section, we report our achieved results for the
dense neural network models about the adversarial attacks and
adversarially training on four different representations, namely
STFT, DWT, STFT appended with tonnetz features, and DWT
appended with tonnetz chromagrams.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We conduct our experiments on two environmental sounds
datasets: UrabanSound8K [33] and ESC-50 [34]. The first
dataset contains 8732 short recording arranged in 10 classes
(car horn, dog bark, drilling, jackhammer, street music, siren,
children playing, air conditioner, engine idling and gun shot)
with the audio length of < 4 seconds. ESC-50 dataset con-
tains 2K audio signals with an equal length of five seconds
organized in 50 classes.
For enhancing both quality and quantity of these datasets,
especially for ESC-50, we filter samples using the pitch-
shifting operation in the temporal domain as proposed in [16].
According to their proposed 1D filtration setup, we use the
scales of {0.75, 0.9, 1.15, 1.5}. This increases the size of the
datasets by a factor of 4.
Following the explanations provided in section IV about
the spectrogram production, the dimension of each result-
ing spectrogram is 1568 × 768 for both STFT and DWT
(the logarithmic scale) representations on the two datasets.
Moreover, the dimensions of the resulting chromagrams is
1568 × 540, which will be appended to the aforementioned
representations. Table I summarizes recognition accuracies of
TABLE I: Recognition performance (%) of the audio classifiers trained on the original spectrogram datasets (without adversarial
example augmentation). Values inside of the parenthesis indicate the recognition percentage drop after adversarially training
the models with the fooling rate AUC > 0.9. Accordingly, the maximum perturbation is achieved at ‖‖2 ≤ 3. Outperforming
accuracies are shown in bold face.
Dataset Representations GoogLeNet AlexNet ResNet-18 ResNet-34 ResNet-56 VGG-16
ESC-50
STFT 67.83, (06.89) 64.32, (10.91) 66.85, (12.13) 67.21, (14.43) 69.77, (09.29) 68.94, (08.32)
DWT 70.42, (08.42) 65.39, (11.23) 67.06, (15.71) 67.55, (18.76) 71.56, (11.09) 71.43, (16.28)
STFT | Tonnetz 70.11, (24.09) 64.21, (23.76) 67.62, (19.48) 66.75, (23.31) 70.22, (25.19) 70.18, (23.68)
DWT | Tonnetz 68.76, (19.07) 68.31, (18.53) 68.49, (24.27) 67.15, (21.56) 71.79, (18.21) 68.37, (18.73)
UrbanSound8K
STFT 88.32, (10.35) 86.07, (21.43) 88.24, (14.94) 88.61, (09.19) 88.77, (23.06) 87.93, (14.66)
DWT 90.10, (16.35) 87.51, (19.59) 88.07, (15.08) 88.38, (19.04) 90.14, (15.49) 90.11, (16.35)
STFT | Tonnetz 88.44, (25.77) 86.81, (22.05) 88.13, (17.64) 88.38, (26.42) 89.41, (20.73) 89.42, (21.38)
DWT | Tonnetz 89.32, (16.83) 87.34, (20.41) 88.76, (29.12) 89.80, (27.45) 91.36, (26.08) 89.97, (24.56)
TABLE II: Robustness comparison (average AUC%) of the adversarially trained models attacked with the constraint ‖‖2 ≤ 3.
Victim models with lower fooling rates are indicated in bold.
Dataset Representations GoogLeNet AlexNet ResNet-18 ResNet-34 ResNet-56 VGG-16
ESC-50
STFT 53.12 50.97 51.13 55.31 53.87 51.05
DWT 55.68 51.03 52.56 54.18 52.26 52.23
STFT | Tonnetz 56.18 50.46 53.10 55.29 54.19 52.82
DWT | Tonnetz 55.74 49.33 54.87 53.77 50.42 51.37
UrbanSound8K
STFT 56.09 53.24 54.08 55.91 57.30 54.35
DWT 58.98 51.92 53.59 54.40 55.86 53.66
STFT | Tonnetz 55.80 50.71 52.75 51.02 54.11 52.39
DWT | Tonnetz 58.46 52.23 55.13 56.81 55.38 55.26
TABLE III: Comparison of r for attacking the original and adversarially trained models with the constraint of AUC > 0.9.
Higher values for r associated with each representation are shown in bold.
Dataset Representations GoogLeNet AlexNet ResNet-18 ResNet-34 ResNet-56 VGG-16
ESC-50
STFT 1.412 1.631 1.897 2.154 2.312 2.107
DWT 1.562 1.509 1.741 1.982 1.976 2.307
STFT | Tonnetz 1.804 1.918 2.003 2.161 2.095 1.674
DWT | Tonnetz 2.014 2.336 1.788 1.903 2.609 2.230
UrbanSound8K
STFT 1.562 1.903 2.439 1.372 1.991 1.703
DWT 2.154 2.287 2.764 1.644 2.892 1.789
STFT | Tonnetz 2.231 2.108 1.981 2.003 1.401 2.308
DWT | Tonnetz 1.606 2.199 2.405 1.604 2.501 1.702
the classifiers trained on these spectrograms. Additionally,
this table shows the effect of the adversarial training on the
recognition performance of these models.
The classifiers in Table I have been selected for evaluation
on the test sets after running the five-fold cross-validation
scenario on the randomized development portion of the train-
ing datasets. Regarding this table, different architectures of
the deep neural networks show competitive performances.
However, in the majority of the cases, the ResNet-56 outper-
forms other classifiers averaged over 10 repeated experiments
on the spectrograms. The highest recognition accuracy has
been achieved by the ResNet-56 architecture, trained on the
appended representation of DWT and tonnetz chromagrams
for both UrbanSound8K and ESC-50 datasets. The number of
parameters in the ResNet-56 is 11.3% and 14.26% higher than
its rival models VGG-16 and ResNet-34, respectively.
Fig. 1 visually compares the adversarial examples crafted
against the outperforming classifier, the ResNet-56, using
the six adversarial attacks with a randomly selected audio
sample and represented with the four spectrograms approaches
described earlier. Although the generated spectrograms are
visually very similar to their legitimate counterparts, they all
make the classifier to predict wrong labels.
Table I also shows the drop ratio of the recognition ac-
curacies after adversarially trained the models following the
procedure explained in section VII. The maximum required
adversarial perturbation for complying with the fooling rate
of AUC > 0.9 is achieved at ‖‖2 ≤ 3, averaged over
all the attacks. In attacking the adversarially trained models,
the procedures outlined in section VI has been implemented
individually for every audio classifiers. According to the
obtained results, adversarial training considerably reduces
the performance of all models. For the ESC-50, the neural
networks trained on the appended representation of STFT
and tonnetz features (STFT | Tonnetz) has experienced the
most negative impact compared to other representations. The
average drop ratio for adversarially trained models on the
DWT | Tonnetz representations is slightly more than the
STFT | Tonnetz counterparts for the UrbanSound8K dataset.
However, for both datasets, these ratio for models trained
on the DWT spectrogram are considerably higher than those
trained with the STFT representations.
We measure the fooling rate of adversarially trained models
after attacking them using the same six adversarial algorithms
following the procedure explained in section VI with the
imposed condition of ‖‖2 ≤ 3 for the adversarial perturbation.
This experiment uncovers the impact of adversarial training
on the robustness of the audio classifiers (see Table II).
We applied the aforementioned condition to make this table
comparable with Table I. Regarding the results reported in
Table II, adversarial training has improved the robustness of
all the classifiers, particularly AlexNet.
For investigating the overall impact of the adversarial
training on the robustness of audio classifiers, we attack
the adversarially trained models using the same six attack
algorithms without the condition of ‖‖2 ≤ 3. Unfortunately,
we could achieve the fooling rate with AUC > 0.9 for all
the classifiers following the attack procedure explained in sec-
tion VI. However, attacking the adversarially trained models
requires larger values for the adversarial perturbation (‖‖2)
compared to attacking the original models and consequently,
increases the number of callbacks to the original spectrogram
with extra batch gradient computations. This might degrade the
quality of the generated spectrograms. In order to analytically
compare the maximum adversarial perturbation required for
the original and the adversarially trained models, we compute
the average perturbation ratio as shown in Eq. 15:
r =
∣∣∣∣ao
∣∣∣∣ (15)
where a and o denote the average adversarial perturbation
required for successfully attacking the adversarially trained
and original models (both with AUC > 0.9), respectively.
Table III summarizes values for r for the victim models
trained on different representations.
Note that an r ≥ 1 indicates the positive impact of ad-
versarial training on the robustness of the audio classifiers via
increasing the computational cost of the attack by expanding
the magnitude of the required adversarial perturbation. With
respect to the measured r metric for all the front-end clas-
sifiers, the ResNet-56 architecture showed better robustness
against adversarial attacks in average for 50% of the exper-
iments. In other words, attacking this model adds additional
cost for the adversary in crafting adversarial examples with
the AUC > 0.9.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the impact of adversarial training
as a gradient obfuscation-free defense approach against adver-
sarial attacks. We trained six advanced deep learning classifiers
on four different 2D representations of environmental audio
signals and run five white-box and one black-box attack
algorithms against these victim models. We demonstrated
that adversarial training considerably reduces the recognition
accuracy of the classifier but improves the robustness against
six types of targeted and non-targeted adversarial examples by
constraining over the maximum required adversarial perturba-
tion to ‖‖2 ≤ 3. In other words, adversarial training is not a
remedy for the threat of adversarial attacks, however it esca-
lates the cost of attack for the adversary with demanding larger
adversarial perturbations compared to the non-adversarially
trained models.
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